CVE-2026-33625
8.8 · HighCode execution in LMDeploy through eval() of a model’s quant_dtype
A crafted quantization_config in a Hugging Face model made LMDeploy pass quant_dtype to eval(), so loading the model ran the attacker’s Python code.
Vulnerability class
Input ends up in eval(), an executed template or a script engine.
4 write-ups, 5 vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-33625
8.8 · HighA crafted quantization_config in a Hugging Face model made LMDeploy pass quant_dtype to eval(), so loading the model ran the attacker’s Python code.
CVE-2026-34398, CVE-2026-34399
7.8 · HighTwo eval() calls in the FreeCAD BIM workbench ran Python read from project and drawing templates, so loading a crafted template executed attacker code.
CVE-2026-35211
6.5 · MediumAny OpenCTI user with the KNOWLEDGE capability could send raw Painless scripts to Elasticsearch through a public filter operator and exhaust the cluster.
CVE-2026-48017
8.8 · HighAny authenticated DbGate user could inject JavaScript into a script the server forks, then escape the require = null sandbox with process.binding.
| Identifier | Product | Vulnerability | CVSS | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-33625 | LMDeploy | eval() of quant_dtype from the model quantization_config | 8.8 High | |
| CVE-2026-34398 | FreeCAD | eval() on .FCStd metadata in the BIM Project Manager | 7.8 High | |
| CVE-2026-34399 | FreeCAD | eval() on the SVG template Scale field in the BIM TechDraw page | 7.8 High | |
| CVE-2026-35211 | OpenCTI | Painless script injection through the script filter operator | 6.5 Medium | |
| CVE-2026-48017 | DbGate | Code injection in loadReader through functionName | 8.8 High |